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NOTES
Impossibility as a Defense to, Criminal Attempt
Two Navy airmen on a "bar hopping" spree stopped at a tavern.
While one of the men was dancing with a young woman, she collapsed
in his arms. Unaware of the cause of her collapse, they subsequently
had sexual intercourse with the apparently unconscious woman. An
autopsy revealed that the woman had died of a heart ailment at the
time of her collapse and prior to the acts of sexual intercourse. Held:
To uphold a conviction for rape, it must be shown beyond a reason-
able doubt that the victim is alive at the time of the offense. How-
ever, the crimes of attempted rape1 and conspiracy to rape are
established even though, unknown to the accused, the "victim" is dead
at the time of the offenses. United States v. Thomas, 13 U.S.C.M.A.
278 (1962).
I. ATTEMPT
The offense of attempt originated in the earliest days of the common
law when convictions for this crime were based on a doctrine bor-
rowed from the ecclesiastical courts.2 Under that doctrine, the will was
taken for the deed.a However, its application was restricted, and only
attempts to commit the more atrocious crimes, such as killing and
robbery, were punished.4 Subsequently, the formulation of specific
substantive offenses covering some of the more common attempts
broadened the scope of punishable conduct Nevertheless, the reluc-
tance of courts to expand these specific substantive offenses left un-
punished a variety of anti-social acts that were dangerous to the
public.
In the late eighteenth century, a decisive conceptual extension of
criminal attempt emerged under the influence of Lord Mansfield's
opinion in Rex v. Scofield.! Although Scofield could not have been
1The instant case proceeded under article 80 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
which provides for the substantive offense of an "attempt" in the following terms: "(a)
An act, done with specific intent to commit an offense . . . amounting to more than mere
preparation and tending, even though failing, to effect its commission, is an attempt to
commit that offense." 64 Stat. 134 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 674 (1951).
Sayre, Criminal Attempts, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 821, 827 (1928).
' See Curran, Criminal and Non-Criminal Attempts, 19 Geo. L.J. 185, 316 (1931);
Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 569 (2d ed. 1960); Sayre, supra note 2.
4 Sayre, supra note 2, at 827. Hall, op. cit. supra note 3, at 560-61.
5 See 7 Geo. II, ch. 21 (1733), a statute which made certain attempts to rob punishable
as assaults with intent to rob. 1 Bishop, Criminal Law § 437 (8th ed. 1892). See Hall,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 562-69; Sayre, supra note 2.
0 Cald. 397 (1784). Lord Mansfield announced:
So long as an act rests in bare intention, it is not punishable by our laws; but
immediately when an act is done, the law judges, not only of the act done,
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found guilty of any criminal attempt then recognized,7 his convic-
tion was based upon the concept that the offense of an "attempt"
could exist independent of any specific crime attempted.' This view
gained rapid acceptance;' by 1837 Baron Parke was able to assert,
without citing authority, that "an attempt to commit a misdemeanor
is a misdemeanor whether the offense is created by statute or was an
offense at common law."'" The significance of Scofield's conviction
and the rapid acceptance of the accompanying theoretical basis in-
dicated judicial extension of criminality to conduct which had not
been punishable under the old ecclesiastical theory or specific statu-
tory prohibitions.
The offense of attempt today is the culmination of efforts to
devise a standard that will serve two major functions: (1) to punish
conduct which, though incomplete, is dangerous to society and at
the same time (2) to prevent punishment (a) for acts done with
criminal intent but not dangerous to society or (b) for mere criminal
intent." At the core of the modern doctrine is the clearly defined
substantive offense of an attempt to commit another crime. The
elements of an attempt are: (1) an intent to commit a specific
crime, (2) an overt act which extends beyond mere preparation and
tends to effect the commission of the crime, and (3) a failure to
consummate the offense initially intended." Thus, the offense of
attempt includes a wide range of anti-social conduct as a distinct
crime against society.
II. IMPOSSIBILITY
Although the requisite specific intent to commit a crime and the
necessary overt act are established in an attempt prosecution," legal
but of the intent with which it is done; and, if it is coupled with an unlawful
and malicious intent, though the act itself would otherwise have been innocent,
the intent being criminal, the act becomes criminal and punishable. Id. at
402-03.
See Hall, op. cit. supra note 3, at 571. Sayre, supra note 2.
' Sayre, supra note 2, at 834.
'Arnold, Criminal Attempts-The Rise And Fall of An Abstraction, 40 Yale L.J. 53,
59 (1930).
9 Curran, supra note 3, at 316-17; Sayre, supra note 2, at 836.
0 Rex v. Roderick, 7 C. & P. 795, 796, 173 Eng. Rep. 347 (N.P. 1837).
" For the historical development of the law of attempt, see Curran, supra note 3, at
191-202, 316; Hall, op. cit. supra note 3, at 558-74; Sayre, supra note 2, at 821-37.
"See Clark & Marshall, Crimes § 4.06 (6th ed. 1958); Hall, op. cit. supra note 3,
at 574-586.
sa For the purpose of establishing the elements of a criminal attempt, both the intent
of the accused as well as the nature of his acts must be viewed in relation to a specific crime
and not from some concept of inherent dangerousness of the accused. Thus, it is established
that the accused must have an intent to commit a specific crime and that an intent to be
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impossibility is a recognized defense. 4 Factual or physical impossi-
bility is not." The basis for the distinction lies in the reason for the
failure of the accused to consummate his plans."
A. Legal Impossibility
The grounds for the defense of legal impossibility can be con-
ceptually divided into two general categories: (1) the intended result
is not a crime 7 and (2) the consummation of the intended crime is
rendered unattainable by virtue of some rule of law. The distinc-
tion is not semantic but conceptual. In the first category, the desired
result is not prohibited, e.g., homicide by witchcraft. Therefore, an
attempt to commit homicide by witchcraft is not an offense. In the
second category, although the final result may be a crime, a rule
of law based upon policy or logic makes the crime legally impossible.
dangerous is insufficient. Keedy, Criminal Attempts At Common Law, 102 U. Pa. L. Rev.
464, 466-68 (1954).
Moreover, it follows that despite the disagreement of authorities as to what constitutes
the necessary kind of overt act, it must also be viewed in relation to the crime contemplated.
Justice Holmes expressed this requirement in Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18,
48 N.E. 770 (1897), as follows:
As the aim of the law is not to punish sins, but is to prevent certain external
results, the act done must come pretty near to accomplishing that result before
the law will notice it. . . . [It is not necessary that the act should be such
as inevitably to accomplish the crime by the operation of natural forces but
for some casual and unexpected interference. Ibid.
14 State v. Taylor, 345 Mo. 325, 133 S.W.2d 336 (1939); State v. Butler, 178 Mo.
272, 77 S.W. 560 (1903); Clark & Marshall, op. cit. supra note 12, at § 4.12; Hall, op. cit.
supra note 3, at 586; Perkins, Criminal Law 494 (1957); Sayre, supra note 2, at 839;
Strahorn, The Effect of Impossibility on Criminal Attempts, 78 U. Pa. L. Rev. 962, 968
(1930).
"'State v. Wilson, 30 Conn. 500 (1862) (reaching into another's pocket is an attempt
to commit larceny although the pocket is empty); Commonwealth v. Williams, 312 Mass.
553, 45 N.E.2d 740 (1942); State v. Mitchell, 170 Mo. 633, 71 S.W. 175 (1902) (shooting
at a bed believing victim was there when in fact victim was in another room is attempted
murder); People v. Moran, 123 N.Y. 254, 25 N.E. 412 (1890). For a comprehensive survey
of cases where factual or physical impossibility has not been allowed as a defense, see Model
Penal Code, comment 30-38 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960). Also see Clark & Marshall, op. cit.
supra note 12, at §§ 4.10-.11; Hall, op. cit. supra note 3, at 586; Sayre, supra note 2, at
858-59.
"6 See generally Clark & Marshall, op. cit. supra note 12, at § 4.06; Arnold, supra note
8; Beale, Criminal Attempts, 16 Harv. L. Rev. 491 (1903); Cook, Act, Intention
and Motive in the Criminal Law, 26 Yale L.J. 645 (1917); Curran, supra note 3; Hoyles,
The Essential of Crime, 46 Can. L.J. 393 (1910); Keedy, supra note 13; Sayre, supra note
2; Skilton, The Mental Element in a Criminal Attempt, 3 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 181 (1937);
Strahorn, supra note 14; Tulin, The Role of Penalties in the Criminal Law, 37 Yale L.J.
1048 (1928); Turner, Attempts to Commit Crimes, 5 Camb. L.J. 230 (1934).
"7Burdick, Crime § 143 (1946); Clark & Marshall, op. cit. supra note 12, at § 4.12;
Williams, Criminal Law § 150 (1953).
"s State v. Taylor, 345 Mo. 325, 133 S.W.2d 336 (1939); State v. Butler, 178 Mo. 272,
77 S.W. 560 (1903); State v. Guffey, 262 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. App. 1953); State v. Porter,
125 Mont. 503, 242 P.2d 984 (1952); Marley v. State, 58 N.J.L. 207, 33 Ati. 208 (Sup.
Ct. 1895); People v. Jaffe, 185 N.Y. 497, 78 N.E. 169 (1906); Bishop, New Criminal Law
S 755 (1892); Burdick, op. cit. supra note 17, at § 143; Hall, op. cit, supra note 3, At
$95-P6; Perkins, op. cit. supra note 14, at 494.
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For example, in a jurisdiction that presumes a fourteen year old boy
is legally incapable of committing rape, the presumption prevents
the commission of an attempt to rape, even though a boy under
that age physically attempts to have intercourse with a woman
against her will."9
The defense of legal impossibility does not deny the existence of
the accused's evil intent nor the occurrence of certain acts of the
accused pursuant to that intent." Rather, the defense vitiates the
criminality of the attempt if the final result would not be a crime
or would be legally impossible to accomplish. 1 Furthermore, if the
defense of legal impossibility applies, the accused's failure to con-
sumate his plans is irrelevant, despite the fact that an essential element
of an attempt is the failure to achieve the anticipated result."
B. Factual Impossibility
Factual or physical impossibility is based upon the absence or
occurrence of some physical or factual event that is unknown to the
defendant and prevents the achievement of the contemplated result."
The disallowance of this event as a defense is justified because the
accused's acts, done in pursuance of an evil intent, present a threat
to society. Also, contrary to legal impossibility, the completed act
"Foster v. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 306, 31 S.E. 503 (1898). See also May v. Pennell,
101 Me. 516, 64 Ad. 885 (1906); Frazier v. State, 48 Tex. Crim. 142, 86 S.W. 754
(1905); Perkins, op. cit. supra note 14, at 494.
The justice in allowing the defense of legal impossibility in the second category lies in
the fact that the impossibility was a consequence of the conceptualization of the consum-
mated crime and has the same legal effect as if the accused intended to achieve a result
which is no crime at all. Since in both categories the accused is ignorant of a rule of law
and since the accused's intent must relate to a specific crime, it is submitted that there is
legally no difference in the accused's intent. Convictions in those cases in which the crime
was legally impossible to commit would have to be based upon the accused's evil intent,
would involve the use of the doctrine of attempt to remedy defects in the criminal law,
and would endanger the very grounds upon which legal impossibility is based, e.g., the
nonexistence of a crime. See Strahorn, supra note 14, at 990. Contra, Model Penal Code,
comment 30 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
"0 The defense of legal impossibility is based upon the premise that despite the accused's
acts and intent, the particular course of conduct is not criminal in law. Regardless of
whether the completed desired result was not prohibited or was legally impossible to achieve,
the defense in either case is based on the accused's misunderstanding of the scope of pro-
hibitions or of some legal rule which renders the completion of the desired result impossible.
21 Hall, op. cit. supra note 3, at 586; Williams, op. cit. supra note 17.
"Clark & Marshall, op. cit. supra note 12, at § 4.12; Hall, op. cit. supra note 3, at 586.
" See Keedy, supra note 13, at 479-89; Sayre, supra note 2, at 843-55. The three groups
of attempt cases in which the problem of factual impossibility arises are: (1) the consum-
mation of the crime was prevented by the interruption of the defendant from completing
all his intended acts or by his voluntary withdrawal, (2) the consummation of the crime
was prevented after the completion of the defendant's intended acts by the interposition
or operation of extraneous forces unexpected by the defendant, and (3) the consummation
of the crime was prevented by some mistake of fact on the part of the defendant. Id. at
858-59. See Strahorn, supra note 14, for a discussion of the relation between impossibility
and liability of the accused.
NOTES
would have constituted a punishable crime." Therefore, the ignorance
of the accused as to the probability of his success does not vitiate the
criminality of his attempt.'
One justification for convictions in which factual and not legal
impossibility is pleaded is termed the "reasonable man" test.2 Under
this view, if the defendant has failed, but a reasonable man acting
under the same circumstances might have expected his acts to be a
crime, the failure is attributed to factual or physical occurrences.
For example, under most conditions a reasonable man knows that
a dummy is not a woman and is not subject to rape, but no matter
how poor a marksman he may be, a reasonable man knows that the
mere pointing and shooting of a weapon toward another can result
in the latter's death.
III. OVERLAP OF ATTEMPT AND IMPOSSIBILITY
Although legal or factual impossibility is conceptually distinct
from the offense of attempt, it is difficult to isolate the determination
of the applicable kind of impossibility from the problem of whether
a given attempt is criminal. Because an attempt by definition in-
volves the failure to consummate a certain desired result, the im-
possibility, though dealing with the reason for the failure, always
follows automatically from a prior determination of whether the
attempt is criminal. Similarly, a determination that a given reason
for the failure is either legal or factual impossibility will necessarily
dictate whether or not the attempt is criminal.
Present authorities are divided as to the purpose of attaching
criminality to an attempt. This disagreement stems from divergent
views on the two essential questions underlying the offense of
attempt. The first question involves the determination of the extent
to which punishment should take into account the importance of
the evil intent of the accused contrasted with the danger to society
presented by his acts.' The second question considers the seriousness
24 Hall, op. cit. supra note 3, at 586-97.
"' See examples cited in note 15 supra. In cases of legal impossibility, the accused is ig-
norant either as to a rule of law which renders consummation of a specific crime incapable
or as to the absence of prohibitions on certain results. In cases of factual or physical im-
possibility, the accused is ignorant of the existence or absence of circumstances which are
essential to the consummation of his plan.
26 Sayre, supra note 2, at 848.
27 Sayre, supra note 2, states:
Under the retributive or expiative theory, the object of criminal justice is
conceived to be punishment qua punishment, and the aim is to make the
defendant suffer in exact proportion to his guilt. Since the proportionment of
an individual's guilt cannot be divorced from moral and psychological con-
siderations, punishment for a criminal attempt under this theory must be
1963 ]
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of the attempted crime in determining whether the attempt should
be an offense. 8 Because the definition of attempt gives no standard
of criminality,"' the recognition of the defense of legal impossibility
often depends upon such factors as the court's view of the facts, its
espousal of a particular theory of criminal justice, and its suscepti-
bility to policy questions.3
IV. THE THOMAS CASE
United States v. Thomas is a case of first impression"' and presents
an unusual intertwining of legal and factual impossibility with the
offense of attempted rape. The facts could be interpreted as present-
ing a case of either legal or factual impossibility with the distinction
between the two depending upon the recognition of the legal conse-
quences of the death rather than the description of the victim's
death as an "event" or a "fact." It is arguable that the crime of rape
cannot legally be committed upon a dead person because the crime
involves the suffering of a living female only." Hence, by virtue of
a rule of law and not the accused's ignorance of a fact, the crime was
incapable of completion. This recognizes the consequence of the
woman's death upon her legal status as a living female; thus, the
ignorance of the accused as to the woman's true legal status is
irrelevant. The status itself or more precisely the lack of the status
as a living person precludes the criminality of the attempt. On the
determined from an essentially subjective viewpoint, i.e., a defendant will
deserve punishment if he actually intended to consummate a crime and com-
mitted such acts as from his viewpoint would be effective in achieving the
crime, quite regardless of whether in the world of facts his acts could or could
not cause the criminal consummation desired. If, on the other hand, one
follows the more modern utilitarian theory of criminal justice, i.e., that the
end of criminal law is to protect public and social interests, and that crimi-
nality should depend primarily therefore, not on moral guilt but on whether
or not social or public interests are unduly injured or endangered, then it
follows that the question of punishment for a criminal attempt must be
determined from an objective viewpoint. Under this view the question of the
criminality of an attempt will depend primarily not on what may have been
passing through the mind of the individual defendant, but on the degree
of actual danger to social or public interests arising from his acts. Id. at 849.
"Compare Beale, supra note 16, at 491 with Curran, supra note 3, at 333; and
compare Curran, supra note 3, at 335-36 with Strahorn, supra note 14, at 971.
28 For the definition of attempt, see text accompanying note 12 supra. It is apparent that
there is no unequivocal indication whether the intent of the accused coupled with certain
acts, or the danger to society from acts done in pursuance of an evil intent, is the focal
point for determining the criminality of an attempt.
as Note the difference in approach between the New York and California courts on the
problem of an attempt to receive stolen cars discussed in 6 Vill. L. Rev. 575 (1961).
a" Although the majority does not make reference to the problem of rape in the field
of attempt, the dissent indicates that the majority is at least aware that they are dealing
with a case of first impression. See 13 U.S.C.M.A. at 295.
O'See 75 C.J.S, Rape 38 (1952); 13 U.S.C.M.A. at 295 (1962).
other hand, if the effect of the death on the woman's legal status is
not recognized by the court, the death is merely another "fact" or
"event" essential to the failure of the intended crime of rape. Under
this view, the ignorance of the accused as to the woman's true condi-
tion constitutes a mere mistake of fact and, as such, is not a defense."
The court, when faced with this difficult choice between factual
or legal impossibility, rejected the defense of legal impossibility in
the second category, i.e., the consummation of the intended crime is
rendered impossible by virtue of some rule of law. The United States
Court of Military Appeals relied entirely upon the Model Penal
Code,' a mere suggestion of the American Law Institute which is
without force of law and which had not been argued by either side."
The Model Penal Code, in effect, partially rejects the legal impossi-
bility defense in order "to reverse the results in cases where attempt
convictions have been set aside on the ground that it was legally
impossible for the actor to have committed the crime contemplated."'"
In other words, the Model Penal Code provides that the defense is
available only in the first category, i.e., the intended result is not a
crime.' The Code justifies rejection of the second category-the
consummation of the intended crime is rendered impossible by virtue
of some rule of law-on the theory that criminal purpose has been
clearly demonstrated, the actor has gone as far as he could in imple-
menting the purpose, and thus his "dangerousness" has been mani-
fested.'"
Regardless of the validity of the Code's rejection of this category
of legal impossibility, the court apparently founded its rejection on
"See text accompanying notes 23-26 supra.
'4Model Penal Code § 5.01 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960) states:
(I) Definition of attempt. A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a
crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the com-
mission of the crime, he:
(a) purposely engages in conduct which would constitute the crime
if the attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be; or
(b) when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, does
or omits to do anything with the purpose of causing or with the belief that
it will cause such result, without further conduct on his part; or
(c) purposely does or omits to do anything which, under the circum-
stances as he believes them to be, is a substantial step in a course of conduct
planned to culminate in his commission of the crime. Id. at 17.
's An examination of the briefs of the prosecution and defense reveals no reference to the
Model Penal Code. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the theory of the prosecution
was quite different from that under which the court convicted the defendants. The prose-
cution's theory was essentially based on the reasonable man test, i.e., the woman's death
prior to the attack was not important since a reasonable man would have, under the cir-
cumstances, believed that the woman was drunk, hence alive. Brief for Prosecution, p. 5.
"8See Model Penal Code, comment 30 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
'" See text accompanying note 19 supra.
38 See note 36 supra.
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what it considered to be a hopeless confusion in existing authority
and the consequential denial of true and substantial justice.s The
court was diligent in citing many of the leading authorities and
cases in the field of attempts. However, the majority opinion did
not deal specifically with the restricted area of attempted rape, but
sought to harmonize all the attempt cases.41 Although the court con-
cluded that the distinction between legal and factual impossibility is
"nebulous, 42 the authorities do not bear out this conclusion." How-
ever, the court's own, though debatable, conclusion of the denial of
true and substantial justice under existing authorities" must have
been instrumental in its search for a more "progressive and modern
view.",
41
By basing its decision upon the Model Penal Code, the court avoid-
ed the choice between factual and legal impossibility. If the court
had treated United States v. Thomas as presenting a case of factual
impossibility, it would have rejected those authorities which uphold
the defense of legal impossibility when the crime is legally impossible
3' 13 U.S.C.M.A. at 285. However, note Judge Ferguson's dissatisfaction with the atti-
tude of the court. 13 U.S.C.M.A. at 295-301.
40 13 U.S.C.M.A. at 282-85 (1962).
" Despite the court's citation of authorities in the field of attempt, the opinion makes
reference only to Arnold, Hall, Sayre, and Strahorn. These writers, on the points for which
they are quoted, are not representative of the remaining authorities that are only cited by
the court. See 13 U.S.C.M.A. at 284-85. Moreover, of these four authorities, two were
seriously misconstrued by the court. Compare the court's utilization of Strahorn, 13
U.S.C.M.A. at 285 with Strahorn's own views. See Strahorn, supra note 14. Note the court's
distortion of Arnold's position by carefully comparing 13 U.S.C.M.A. at 285 with Arnold,
supra note 8, at 71.
42 13 U.S.C.M.A. at 287.
' For example, the court, in reading Perkins, op. cit. supra note 14, at 494, failed to
consider the following statement:
If a certain act of forcible intercourse with a woman does not constitute rape
(husband with wife, for example), an attempt to do so, or even the completed
act, does not constitute an attempt to commit rape, even if it does constitute
a different crime,-assault and battery. The answer is the same even if the
husband made the attack in the dark thinking the woman was not his wife.
The actual attempt, as distinguished from a mental abstraction, was to have
an act of intercourse which was not rape. (Emphasis added.)
See also 1 Bishop, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 753; Sayre, supra note 2, at 858; Smith, Two
Problems in Criminal Attempts, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 422, 439-42 (1957); Strahorn, supra
note 14, at 986; Burdick, op. cit. supra note 17, at § 144; Williams, op. cit. supra note 17,
at § 150.
4 13 U.S.C.M.A. at 285. See note 43 supra.
45 13 U.S.C.M.A. at 285, 286. After citing the provision of the Model Penal Code dealing
with attempt, the court said:
After having given this entire question a great deal more than casual atten-
tion and study, we are forced to the conclusion that the law of attempts in
military jurisprudence has tended toward the advanced and modern position,
which position will be achieved for civilian jurisprudence if The American
Law Institute is completely successful in its advocacy of this portion of the
Model Penal Code. (Emphasis added.) Ibid.
The implication as to the Code's persuasiveness in advocating the attempt provision is
erroneous. See Model Penal Code, supra note 15.
to commit even though it is shown that the accused had an evil intent
and acted pursuant to it."8 The court would also have rejected
analogizing the problem of the instant case to an attempt to murder a
corpse, which is recognized as not 'being a criminal attempt."7 Further-
more, such a view of the case would have entailed rejection of the
prevalent view that a dead body cannot be subject to the same crimes
as a living person." Finally, the court would have punished more on
the basis of evil intent than on the basis of the injury or threat of
injury to the particular victim." On the other hand, if the court had
recognized the defense of legal impossibility, it would have applied
only slight punishment although the accused had an evil intent to
commit a heinous crime.0 Moreover, the court would have rejected
the theory that punishment of an individual who has demonstrated
his dangerousness is justified to protect all women and not just the
particular victim. 1 Finally, this view of the case would have been
tantamount to rejection of the well-recognized "reasonable man"
test."
V. CONCLUSION
The Model Penal Code was not essential to the decision of this
case. Under existing authorities, the court could have applied the
"reasonable man" test or viewed the particular circumstances as
presenting a case of factual impossibility. However, both the court
and the Model Penal Code are wrong in rejecting legal impossibility
in the second category, i.e., the consummation of the intended crime
is rendered impossible by virtue of some rule of law. Although the
court is correct in -noting that the authorities are in confusion, there
is, contrary to the court's view, general agreement that the legal
impossibility defense is sound. The confusion results from disagree-
46 See notes 17-21 supra.
See Curran, supra note 3, at 185-86; Keedy, supra note 13, at 468. Although the
court cited State v. Taylor, 345 Mo. 325, 133 S.W.2d 336 (1939), and State v. Guffey,
262 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. 1953), it failed to apply the holdings in both cases that it is no
crime to attempt to murder a corpse because it cannot be murdered.4
8See Brooks v. Boston & N. St. Ry., 211 Mass. 277, 97 N.E. 760 (1912), where the
court said: "It is axiomatic that a corpse is not a person. That which constitutes a person
is separated from the body by death and that which remains is 'dust and ashes,' sacred to
kin and friends, whose feelings and rights in this regard receive the protection of the law.
" In Deeg v. City of Detroit, 345 Mich. 371, 76 N.W.2d 16 (1956), the Michigan
Supreme Court also recognized this distinction by holding that mutilation of a corpse was
a cause of action based upon injury or damage to the feelings of the next of kin, but not
for damage to the corpse since there is no property right in a corpse.
49 Strahorn, supra note 14; see note 27 supra.
"The prosecution had established that the accused had committed sexual intercourse on
the woman. The offense of lewd and lascivious conduct in violation of article 134 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice was therefore undisputedly committed.
51 See Arnold, supra note 8; Curran, supra note 3; Sayre, supra note 2.
5' See text accompanying note 26 supra.
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